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I. INTRODUCTION 
What are lawyers for?  What social purposes do lawyers serve?  
What functions underwrite the special obligations and entitlements that 
accompany the lawyer’s professional role? 
I shall try, over the course of the next hour or so, to sketch an 
answer to these questions, at least with respect to lawyers who function 
as litigators, in adjudication.  The answer will surprise many.  Lawyers, I 
shall argue, do not serve truth or justice, and should not seek them.  
Instead, lawyers serve to legitimate power.  And to produce legitimacy, 
lawyers should serve their clients. 
Of course, not all lawyers work in or around adjudication.  Perhaps 
most do not, at least not most of the time.  But adjudication remains the 
lawyer’s characteristic setting.  Non-lawyers might provide advice, 
including about legal compliance or drafting.  But only lawyers can 
litigate; indeed, it is in the nature of adjudication that only lawyers can 
litigate — so that those who litigate thereby become, functionally, 
lawyers.  The conceptually most important aspect of lawyers’ work is 
not the empirically most prominent.  And insofar as legal ethics has, in 
recent years, adjusted its sights to focus on the commonplaces of legal 
*Daniel Markovits is Guido Calabresi Professor of Law at Yale Law School.  He would like to 
thank Jack Sahl for the opportunity to give this address and the editors of the Akron Law Review for 
outstanding assistance in preparing the written text. 
These remarks revisit and in some ways expand upon themes first addressed in A MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS and also explored in a forthcoming essay on Lawyerly Fidelity, to be published in NOMOS 
LIV: LOYALTY (forthcoming 2013). 
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practice, it has in important respects lost its way. 
The bulk of my remarks today will be devoted to defending these 
claims.  I shall speak in favor of a particular substantive account of 
client-centered lawyering — which emphasizes the virtue that I shall call 
lawyerly fidelity.  I shall argue that lawyerly fidelity best captures the 
role that our positive law accords lawyers — that lawyerly fidelity 
promotes the social purpose that lawyers serve.  In spite of the costs and 
burdens that fidelity imposes — costs to truth, to justice, and to the 
moral lives of the lawyers who display it — the positive law is right to 
insist that lawyers first and foremost display fidelity to their clients.  
Political legitimacy requires lawyerly fidelity. 
But before taking up substance, I want to make a brief remark about 
method.  The arguments that follow present an exercise in applied ethics, 
which is, to speak politely, a troubled field — one commonly thought 
adequate neither to the practical questions it takes as its subjects nor to 
the philosophical traditions in which it attempts to address these 
subjects. 
The source of the trouble, I think, lies in method. 
The dominant method in applied ethics is casuistry — an exercise 
in applying a general philosophical view of ethics to a more particular 
set of facts in a prescriptive way.  The conventional approach cannot 
provide much advantage, however, either for philosophy or for action.  
Decisions concerning how to act cannot be well-made by applying 
theory to facts in a mechanical fashion.  Instead, successful practical 
reasoning requires judgment and even creativity, which are themselves 
free-standing ethical faculties that no amount of antecedent ethical 
theory can displace.  Philosophical ethics is therefore structurally 
unsuited to serving a directly regulative role in practical life. 
Instead, philosophy’s aim should be interpretive and reconstructive 
— to identify the ideals that are immanent in some ethical practice and 
to explain the relationship between these ideals and others, which are 
perhaps deeper or broader.  Philosophical ethics can set the scene, but it 
cannot (and so should not) drive the action. 
In the rest of these remarks, I shall try to provide a philosophically 
informed interpretive reconstruction of the lawyer’s peculiar 
professional virtue — the virtue that I call fidelity.  Lawyerly fidelity is 
immanent in legal practice under the conditions of the rule of law.  
Lawyerly fidelity arises, I shall argue, wherever lawyers practice subject 
to the structural separation between advocate and tribunal that 
characterizes all legal systems committed to the rule of law.  I shall 
elaborate the contours of lawyerly fidelity and explain the contributions 
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that fidelity makes to the rule of law. 
II. THE POSITIVE LAW OF LAWYERLY FIDELITY 
As my method recommends, I begin with the raw materials to be 
interpreted.  These raw materials appear in the law governing lawyers.  
This body of law organizes lawyers’ professional obligations according 
to three regulative ideals, which fix the genetic structure of adversary 
advocacy.  These ideals may vary at their margins across legal orders, 
but they necessarily appear, embodied in the positive law, in every 
system of adjudication that separates the roles of advocate and tribunal. 
The first and most familiar of the three principles is lawyer loyalty.  
This is the idea that lawyers should commit their energies in a partisan 
way, in favor of particular clients rather than directly pursuing truth or 
justice.  Loyalty is written into modern American law through the 
requirements that lawyers display diligence and zeal on behalf of their 
clients.1 Lawyers’ partisanship is, of course, constrained, for example, 
by various duties of candor.2  But these duties do not, because they are 
not structurally suited to so-doing, eliminate lawyers’ underlying loyalty 
to clients.3  There are things that lawyers may not do to serve their 
clients, but they must nevertheless serve their clients rather than judging 
them.  Lawyers may not act in the interests of justice, directly and all 
things considered. 
Lawyerly loyalty, however, does not yet fix the precise ends in 
whose favor lawyers should be partisans.  This is done by the second 
basic principle regulating lawyers’ professional conduct — the principle 
of client control.4  This principle requires lawyers to serve not their 
clients’ interests — and certainly not the clients’ interests in justice – but 
rather the clients’ intentions or, slightly more broadly, the clients’ points 
of view.  It is — emphatically — for clients to fix the ends of a 
representation, and lawyers may not substitute their judgments of what 
ends clients should pursue for the clients’ own.  Once again, a lawyer 
must serve rather than judge her clients; and she must therefore defer to 
her clients’ independent judgments about ends.  The lawyer’s deference 
 1.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT Pmbl. (2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW OF GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000).  
 2.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 3.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2011), which might undo partisanship, is 
thus necessarily narrowly and technically construed. 
 4.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
LAW OF GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 (2000). 
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need not be absolute, of course.  There remain some ends that a client 
cannot command her lawyers to assist in pursuing.  But the lawyer 
cannot simply substitute her personal judgment about ends to supplant 
her client’s. 
Where a lawyer tries to judge rather than to serve, the law will 
thwart her efforts.  For example, where a criminal defense lawyer who 
has become convinced of her client’s guilt argues for conviction rather 
than acquittal, her assistance in conducting his defense is treated as 
constitutionally defective per se.  The law foregoes the usual 
requirement of showing that ineffective assistance of counsel was 
prejudicial to the client’s defense.  Instead, a defendant whose lawyer 
judges rather than serves him is treated by the courts as having had an 
actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether5 — that 
is, as having had no lawyer at all.  Although lawyers in civil cases turn 
on their clients much more rarely, similar principles apply where they 
do.  For example, a lawyer may not (prejudicially) withdraw from a 
representation simply because she regards her client’s refusal to settle as 
foolish or even repugnant.6  Indeed, this principle (of client control over 
settlements) is so central to the lawyer client relation that it may not be 
altered even by contract.7 
Finally, the principles of lawyer loyalty and client control operate 
against a fundamental but often overlooked background norm of legal 
assertiveness.  This gives lawyers and clients a right to pursue legal 
claims free of the ordinary standards of liability that the law imposes on 
conduct that harms others.  Lawyers, for example, enjoy immunity from 
tort liability for defamatory remarks made in court,8 and lawyers who 
encourage clients to breach contracts are immune from liability for 
tortious interference.9  More generally, and much more importantly, 
lawyers and clients are jointly protected against liability for harms that 
they cause by asserting losing and even unreasonable claims and 
defenses.  The various rules that prohibit frivolous filings — from both 
 5.  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 349-50 (1980). 
 6.  DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 73-77 (2010). 
 7.  See, e.g., Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. App. Ct. 1994). 
 8.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. e (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57(1) 
(2000). 
 9.  See, e.g., Salaymeh v. InterQual, Inc., 508 N.E. 2d 1155, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).  The 
lawyer may be liable where her advice to breach arises out of “actual malice” against the contractual 
counterparty that is “unrelated to [her] desire to protect [her] client.”  Id. at 1160. 
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the law governing lawyers and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — 
do not impose strict liability or even negligence liability for the harms 
done by asserting losing legal claims.10  Losing on summary judgment, 
or even on a motion to dismiss, clearly does not trigger sanctions.  
Moreover, although tort law recognizes torts of malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process, these are very narrowly cabined.11  Certainly, 
clients and lawyers may proceed even when the social costs of their 
doing so (far) outweigh the social benefits.  (Here note the contrast 
between this area and the rule of liability for negligence in tort law more 
generally.) 
Legal assertiveness amounts to a special dispensation to cause harm 
by asserting legal positions.  In particular, legal assertiveness departs 
dramatically from the ordinary standards of liability for harming others 
imposed by the general law of torts.  This is a very deep feature of open 
legal orders.  It is on par with its more celebrated cousins: The rule that 
free expression should not be constrained by liability for harms 
associated with the offense that its exercise gives others; and the rule 
that economic freedom should not be constrained by liability for the 
harms (for example, being driven out of business by a superior 
competitor) that economic competition causes. 
In fact, the right of legal assertiveness is a direct consequence of the 
structural division of labor between advocate and tribunal from which 
my reconstruction of the lawyer’s peculiar brand of loyalty set out.  That 
idea is familiarly taken to entail that a party may not act as a judge in her 
own case.  But it also — less familiarly but no less importantly — 
entails that a party, and her lawyer, need not act as a judge.  It frees 
parties and their lawyers from the responsibility of reaching and acting 
upon an impartial assessment of their claims. 
The doctrinal materials also provide an organizing principle for 
these three regulative ideals.  This is the principle of professional 
detachment that appears throughout the formal and informal ideology of 
the bar, including prominently in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.12 
Professional detachment is familiarly invoked by lawyers as a 
shield against various forms of liability for actions taken on behalf of 
 10.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 11.  See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 850-53 (4th ed. 
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 
(1977); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., 
389 A.2d 607, 608, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). 
 12.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011). 
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clients.  The discussion of legal assertiveness has already illustrated this 
with respect to legal liability.  And lawyers have also, although more 
dubiously, tried to assert professional detachment as a shield against 
moral liability for promoting their clients’ wrongful causes. 
But the more interesting and important aspect of professional 
detachment is its operation as a sword, to forbid lawyers from judging 
rather than serving their clients.  Thus, when a lawyer compromises her 
client’s case because of her own judgment that it lacks merit, this in 
itself renders otherwise unobjectionable conduct impermissible.  This is 
illustrated by the examples of judgmental lawyering that I invoked a few 
moments ago.  In criminal cases, a lawyer’s refusal to assert an 
otherwise permissible defense because of her personal belief in her 
client’s guilt constitutes actual or constructive denial of counsel, and 
hence renders her assistance constitutionally ineffective even without the 
showing of prejudice that is usually required.  Indeed, one hears courts 
say that a professionally detached defense counsel is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for a criminal trial.13  And in civil cases, a lawyer must defer 
absolutely to a client’s choices concerning settlement, even when they 
are unreasonable.  Once again, the duty to defer is so strong that a 
contract that allows the lawyer to judge her client by vesting discretion 
to settle in the lawyer becomes for this reason invalid and indeed a 
breach of professional ethics.14 
Professional detachment is not just a creature of distinctively 
professional ethics, but may instead be given an interpretation that 
sounds in ethics, simpliciter, which returns the argument to the peculiar 
form of loyalty that lawyers display.  Often, lawyers’ loyalty to their 
clients is analogized to friendship or, a little more broadly, to 
fraternity.15  This is a mistake, and not just for the familiar reason that 
lawyerly loyalty is for hire, whereas friendship is not.  Rather, the 
analogy between lawyers’ loyalty and ordinary fraternity fails for 
another and very different reason.  Friends throw themselves — their 
whole judgments — into their friendships.  But professionally detached 
lawyers withdraw themselves — they do not judge but rather serve. 
This combination of other-preference and self-effacement renders 
lawyers’ partisanship highly peculiar — not positive and self-affirming 
like fraternity but rather much more negative.  Like a good music 
system, lawyers are negatively capable.  They can give expression to 
 13.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980). 
 14.  See, e.g., Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. App. Ct. 1994). 
 15.  See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976). 
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their clients’ points of view without imposing distortions based on their 
own attitudes.  By effacing themselves, lawyers can speak for their 
clients in high fidelity. 
III. LAWYERLY FIDELITY AND THE AUTHORITY OF ADJUDICATION 
Lawyerly fidelity is a substantial virtue.  The lawyer’s distinctive 
capacity to reserve her own judgment — to be what Keats once called “a 
thoroughfare for all thoughts.  Not a select party”16 — is essential to her 
capacity to help guide otherwise intractable disputes towards a 
resolution that disputants accept as legitimate. 
This is no small achievement.  Legitimacy is the basic aim — the 
first virtue — of politics in open, cosmopolitan, and, hence, pluralist 
societies.  These societies are characterized by intractable conflicts — 
both among competing interests and among competing views of the 
general interest.  They therefore depend, for their stability and ultimately 
their survival, on agreement about which collective choices to 
implement even in the face of entrenched and ineliminable disagreement 
about which collective choices to adopt. 
The problem of legitimacy is most familiar at wholesale — 
concerning the general rules (the laws) through which collective life 
should be governed.  But legitimacy is also, and indeed equally, a 
problem at retail — concerning how to apply these rules in particular, 
problem cases, whose outcomes are not fixed mechanically by wholesale 
political settlements.  Finally, whereas what is commonly called the 
“political” system aspires to achieve legitimacy at wholesale, what is 
commonly called the “legal” system aspires to achieve legitimacy at 
retail.  It is, as Karl Llewellyn said, one of the “law-jobs” to sustain 
authoritative resolutions of “trouble cases,” and adjudication aspires to 
achieve legitimate authority over such cases.17 
This idea, that adjudication’s principal ambition is authority, is not 
always well-understood.  Lawyers commonly think of adjudication as 
aiming at truth or justice.  But the common view confuses the tribunal or 
court with the broader system of adjudication — involving disputants 
and lawyers — in which the court properly plays a starring role.  The 
court might well aim at truth and justice.  Indeed, the authority of 
 16.  JOHN KEATS, Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27 
September 1819, in LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 326 (Robert Gittings ed., 1970). 
 17.  K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE 
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 293 (1941). 
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adjudication might depend on courts’ pursuing this aim.18  But the court 
is just as much a part-player in the broader system of adjudication as the 
other elements of that system — the disputants and the lawyers (who do 
not aim at truth or justice at all).  The thought that adjudication aspires to 
truth and justice because courts (properly) do involves an unfortunate 
synecdoche.  Adjudication writ large aspires not to the accurate or just 
resolution of disputes, but rather to their legitimate resolution. 
Now some have supposed that political legitimacy might be 
achieved through purely theoretical argument.  According to those who 
think in this way, political legitimacy might arise out of general 
agreement on abstract principles to regulate collective life.  There is no 
need, on this theoretical view, for any actual politics or for the 
participatory engagements among affectively involved disputants that 
politics invites.  The theoretical approach thus places the understanding 
at the center of political legitimacy. 
The theoretical approach to political legitimacy is most familiar at 
wholesale, in theories of high liberalism that believe philosophical 
argument can legitimate the liberal state.  The most prominent recent 
theory of this sort came from John Rawls.  Rawls argued that principles 
of justice might be defended by reason alone.  When Rawls wrote that 
“[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought,”19 he established the theoretical approach to political legitimacy 
as an animating assumption of his theory of justice.  He proposed, in this 
vein, that all persons (whatever their peculiar interests and 
comprehensive moral and religious outlooks) might converge on the 
basic constitutional principles that characterize a fair political order 
among free and equal citizens.20  For Rawls, a successful theory of 
justice permits no reasonable political dissent (even as the principles of 
the theory leave much space for moral disagreement).  Once principles 
of justice have received a theoretical defense, therefore, no distinct 
problem of political legitimacy any longer arises. 
The theoretical approach to political legitimacy has an analog at 
retail, although thinking in such terms is much less familiar in the retail 
context.  The most elaborate theoretical approach to retail political 
legitimation is the traditional “adversary system excuse” account of 
partisan lawyering.  This view proposes to demonstrate that adjudication 
 18.  See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201 (2d Cir. 2002), which observed that 
an impartial fact-finder is an essential element of due process. 
 19.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). 
 20.  See generally id., especially Chapter 40, “The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as 
Fairness.” 
 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss1/7
ARTICLE 7 MARKOVITS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2014  10:28 AM 
2014] WHAT ARE LAWYERS FOR? 143 
managed through partisan lawyers best tracks the accurate and just 
application of wholesale principles to retail disputes.  Proponents of the 
adversary system excuse aspire to persuade all reasonable people that 
they cannot better approximate true and just dispute resolution than 
through adversary adjudication.  The adversary system excuse proposes, 
in this way, to sustain a theoretical legitimation of adjudicative 
outcomes.21 
In spite of its appeal, the theoretical approach to legitimacy can 
never entirely overcome the specter of applying its own methods to its 
conclusions.  Human nature and human circumstances conspire so that 
reasonable disagreement recurs all the way up — at every level of 
principle.  At wholesale, there is ineliminable reasonable disagreement 
not just about comprehensive morality but also about theories of justice 
— liberal or otherwise — and, indeed, about theories of legitimacy.  
And at retail, there is ineliminable reasonable disagreement not just 
about what resolutions of individual disputes are true and just but also 
about which procedures — adversary or otherwise — best identify these 
resolutions.  The circumstances of practical life are such that every 
theory admits of reasonable dissent.  The understanding, taken alone, 
cannot legitimate. 
A second, very different, approach to legitimacy becomes naturally 
desirable.  This approach is practical.  Practical accounts of political 
legitimacy seek to exploit the affective consequences of actual 
engagement, by disputants, in the processes by which disputes are 
resolved and collective choices are made.  The practical approach to 
legitimacy exploits the power of process — through the actual 
engagements of those who participate in it — to sustain ownership of 
chosen outcomes even among participants who aimed to produce 
different ones.  The practical approach places the will at the center of 
legitimacy.  It is exemplified, at wholesale, by democracy — understood 
in the ordinary sense of political competition through parties and 
elections.  The practical approach to legitimacy at retail invites 
justifications of lawyerly partisanship that emphasize lawyerly fidelity. 
A contrast between theoretical and practical accounts of the 
legitimacy of adjudication initiates the new defense of lawyerly fidelity.  
Theoretical approaches to the legitimacy of adjudication 
characteristically treat the legal process as transparent.  They suppose 
 21.  One might perhaps say that whereas Rawls casts justice as fairness in terms of pure 
procedural justice, the adversary system excuse casts adversary adjudication in terms of imperfect 
(but best available) procedural justice.  See id. at 84-86. 
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that one might look backward through a process — an adjudication, in 
the case at hand — from its end to its beginning and see the same claims 
and values asserted throughout.  (Theoretical approaches to wholesale 
legitimacy, and in particular to democratic authority, arise from a 
parallel premise, and make a parallel mistake, although that is a topic for 
another occasion.) 
Practical approaches to legitimacy, by contrast, borrow from the 
sociology of law to observe that, in fact, processes, including 
adjudication, are transformative — that mechanisms for dispute 
resolution influence the objectives that disputants pursue.  When 
adjudication works, its transformative effects are so powerful that, as 
Lon Fuller once observed, it “reorient[s] the parties toward each 
other.”22  The transformed dispute then “can actually become the 
dispute,” as disputants abandon any claims that cannot be 
accommodated within the transformation.23  When this happens, the 
legitimacy of adjudication follows, because the reconstructed disputes 
and the resolutions that the legal process proposes have been tailored to 
suit each other.  Parties who come (through their affective engagements 
with the legal process) to see their disputes as the legal process proposes 
also come to accept the resolutions that the legal process recommends. 
Substantial evidence from social psychology suggests that 
adjudication does work in this way.  People’s compliance with the law, 
as it is applied to them, depends significantly on their judgments 
concerning the legitimacy of the authorities who apply it.24  Judgments 
concerning legitimacy, in turn, depend on judgments concerning the 
procedures that the authorities employ in determining what the law 
requires, and especially in resolving disputes about this.  Moreover, 
people’s judgments concerning procedures are practical and affective 
rather than theoretical and detached.  People assess legitimacy as 
participants, focusing more on their “opportunities to state their case” 
and less on their “influence” in producing decisions that they regard as 
accurate.25  Finally, although people do not require direct influence, they 
do insist that their participation be more than merely pro forma and that 
 22.  Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 115, 135 (Michael Freeman ed., 1995). 
 23.  William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , in THE LEGAL STUDIES READER: A 
CONVERSATION & READINGS ABOUT LAW 227, 240 (George Wright & Maria Wyant Stalzer Cuzzo 
eds., 2004). 
 24.  See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
COOPERATE (2011). 
 25.  TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 126 (1990). 
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it involve genuine opportunities to be heard.  The legal process cannot 
secure legitimacy merely by “providing structural opportunities [for 
disputants] to speak;” instead disputants “must also infer that what they 
say is being considered by the decision-maker.”26 
This is where lawyers and lawyerly fidelity come into their own.  
Courts remain separated from litigants by their institutional character 
and obligations of impartiality.  Furthermore, both substantive laws and 
processes of adjudication necessarily possess a formal or technical 
character.  A tribunal’s willingness and indeed capacity seriously to 
consider disputants’ views thus depends on their receiving a particular 
and (literally) extraordinary expression.  And lawyers (as specialists in 
the required form of expression) therefore play a central role in 
adjudication’s legitimacy.  Disputants require lawyers to bridge the gap 
between them and tribunals.  And only lawyers who practice lawyerly 
fidelity can connect disputants to tribunals in the fashion on which the 
legitimacy of adjudication depends. 
Most shallowly, lawyers objectify and organize disputants’ claims, 
translating particular demands and complaints into the more general and 
impersonal language of the law.  Clients, for their parts, must trust 
lawyers to understand their claims and, moreover, must trust lawyers’ 
commitment to and capacity for fidelity in translation.  Only lawyers 
who practice the self-effacement associated with fidelity can sustain 
such trust.  At an intermediate level, lawyers test disputants’ claims, 
eliminating those that are tangential or implausible in favor of more 
central and stronger ones.  Once again, only faithful lawyers will be able 
to persuade their clients that their deflationary advice concerning 
extravagant or unreasonable claims genuinely serves the clients rather 
than the legal system or even just the lawyers’ personal judgments.  And 
at the deepest level, lawyers reconstitute disputants’ claims, 
transforming them from brute demands into assertions of right, which 
recognize immanently the possibility of their own failures.  Only 
lawyers who practice high fidelity will succeed at capturing all of their 
clients’ grievances for the law’s logic of right and defeasance. 
The fidelity of lawyers thus sustains all three levels of 
adjudication’s transformative powers.  By contrast, lawyers who 
abandon fidelity and aspire to serve their own personal ideals quite 
literally pre-judge their clients.  And when this happens, the legitimacy 
of the legal process becomes dependent on the legitimacy of the 
lawyers’ judgments.  But these judgments, being creatures of the 
 26.  Id. at 149. 
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lawyers’ individual minds, are virtually impossible to legitimate.  
Certainly, lawyers’ judgments cannot be legitimated by reference to the 
transformative powers of a legal process that has not yet begun.  
Lawyers who abandon their adversary role merely shift the burden of 
legitimation forward to their own assessments, which necessarily 
address their clients’ demands in an untransformed, and hence 
intractable, state. 
Lawyerly fidelity thus establishes the foundation for adjudication’s 
practical legitimacy.  One might say, by way of summary, that in order 
for adjudication to achieve legitimacy, lawyers must deny the potentially 
alienating features of adjudication (in particular, the legal process’s 
divided sympathies) any foothold within the lawyer-client relation itself.  
Instead, lawyers must structure the lawyer-client relation so that they are 
able, through it, to “bring . . . the client’s case in a nonjudgmental way to 
the authoritative institutions of society.”27 Only adversary advocates, 
who practice the fidelity that I have elaborated, can achieve this. And 
lawyerly fidelity therefore carries all the ethical significance of being 
necessary for sustaining the transformations in disputants’ attitudes on 
which the legitimacy of the legal process depends.28 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lawyerly fidelity is not a sham or charade.  Instead, fidelity lies at 
the very center of the law’s claim to legitimacy.  Indeed, lawyerly 
fidelity presents a retail analog to the democratic virtues that are so 
notoriously celebrated throughout the civilized world.  Lon Fuller once 
observed that “[v]iewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan 
advocate appears not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable 
part of a larger ordering of affairs.  The institution of advocacy is not a 
concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human 
insight in the design of a social framework within which man’s capacity 
 27.  Stuart Scheingold, Taking Weber Seriously: Lawyers, Politics, and the Liberal State, 24 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1061, 1063 (1999). 
 28.  Once again, this is supported by research in social psychology: A study of felony trials, 
for example, reported that defendants’ attitudes towards the legitimacy of their trial courts were 
substantially determined by the intensity of their interactions with their lawyers, measured by 
factors “such as how often their attorney had consulted with them in deciding how to resolve their 
case.” TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 105 (1990).  See also J. CASPER, THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE (1970); Casper, J., Tyler, T., & Fisher, B., Procedural 
Justice in Felony Cases, (American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Ill., Working Paper No. 87-03, 1987).  
Indeed, the subjective experience of legitimacy seems to have been more influenced by the intensity 
of defendants’ interactions with their lawyers than by the intensity of their interactions with their 
tribunals (for example, whether their cases were resolved by plea bargain or trial).  Id. 
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for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization.”29 
Lawyerly fidelity thus serves, ultimately, a high purpose.  Persons 
disagree — pervasively and profoundly — about what impartiality 
requires.  Their disagreements cannot ever be finally resolved by 
theoretical argument, as theories reproduce intractable disagreement at 
every level.  But even if the disagreements cannot be settled, they must 
be contained through practical and institutional measures.  Lawyerly 
fidelity belongs to the program that institutes such measures.  And so 
lawyers’ partiality stands in a complex, nested, and even symbiotic 
relation to impartial justice.  The closest approximation to an impartially 
justified order that persons can reasonably hope to achieve is possible 
only through the ministrations of highly partial lawyers, who faithfully 
serve rather than judge their clients. 
 
 29.  Lon Fuller & John Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958). 
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